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RECENT DECISIONS
EVIDENCE- HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS - ADMISSION OF PRINCI-
PAL'S EXTRAJUDICIAL DECLARATIONS AGAINST SuRETY - RES
GESTAE REQUIREmENT ABANDONED. - In an action by an em-
ployer to recover on a fidelity bond for the defalcations of an
employee, the employer sought to introduce extrajudicial written
statements of the employee, admitting the theft, some of which
were made after the termination of employment. The New York
Court of Appeals held that the statements were admissible against
the surety, the test not being whether the statements were part
of the res gestae, but whether the declarant was available for
cross-examination and whether in fact the statements were actually
made. Letendre v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 21 N.Y.2d
518, 236 N.E.2d 467, 289 N.Y.S.2d 183 (1968).
At early common law, juries conducted their own independent
investigation in order to arrive at conclusions of fact.' Under
modem procedure, however, they are limited to the evidence
presented at trial by the respective parties. Since the purpose
of the fact-finding process is to arrive at the truth, the law deems
it necessary at times to exclude certain testimony from the jury,
which if presented, would pose a danger of misleading the triers
of fact and, therefore, distort the fact-finding process.2
The method that the adversary process employs to determine
the truth is similar to that used in the Hegelian dialectic, i.e.,
from the battle of opposites comes the truth. Therefore, by
subjecting the testimony of a witness to cross-examination, it is
felt that mistakes and lies will be weeded out and exposed.3
Without cross-examination, an essential element of the truth-
finding process would not be present. It is such a deprivation
of the right to cross-examine which constitutes the principal
justification of the hearsay rule.4
1E. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEM S OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-AMERCAN
SYSTEM OF LITIGATION 107 (1956): " The jurors were free to consult any
source which they deemed reliable, and, indeed, were expected to supplement,
before their appearance in court, what personal knowledge they had
concerning the facts by inquiry of others, including the parties." See also
E. McCoRMimCK, EVIDENCE §223 (1954).2 Buchanan v. Nye, 128 Cal. App. 2d 582, 275 P.2d 767 (1954).
3 Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept,
62 HARv. L. REv. 177, 185 (1948).
4 W. RICHARDSON, EVIDENCE § 207 (9th ed. 1964). See NLRB v.
Imparato Stevedoring Corp., 250 F.Zd 297 (3rd Cir. 1957); Pettus v. Casey,
358 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1962); Cooper Corp. v. Jeffcoat, 217 S.C. 489, 61
S.E.2d 53 (1950).
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Hearsay is a statement of testimonial value, offered to prove
the truth of the matters asserted therein.5 If the statement is
offered to prove or establish some fact other than that asserted
in the statement itself, then it is not hearsay.6 For example,
if at an incompetency hearing, an extrajudicial declaration of
the alleged incompetent is offered, wherein he stated he was
the "Emperor of Africa," it will be admitted since the purpose
of submitting the statement is not to prove its truth, but rather,
the abnormal mental state of the patient.7  The theory of hearsay
involves the situation wherein the trier must depend upon the
declarant, not the witness on the stand who relates the state-
ment, for the statement's veracity. Generally a witness may
testify to the acts of another, for this involves only the witness'
perception of facts, which may be cross-examined. The hearsay
rule excludes a witness' testimony as to the statements of another,
for this involves the perception of facts by the other, who, being
absent, can not be cross-examined. Thus, the basic objection to
admitting the statement is that the trier must look to someone
not in the courtroom for its accuracy and veracity.8
However, it is not in itself sufficient that the opportunity
for cross-examination be present to avoid the objection of hearsay.
5 Northern Trust Co. v. Moscatelli, 54 Ill. App. 2d 316, 203 N.E.2d
447 (1964); Stevenson v. Abbott, 251 Iowa 110, 99 N.W.2d 429 (1959);
Still v. Travelers Indem. Co., 374 S.W.2d 95 (Mo. 1963); McCord v.
Ashbaugh, 67 N.M. 61, 352 P.2d 641 (1960).6 Dussault v. Condon, 170 Cal. App. 2d 693, 339 P.2d 896 (1959);
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Sommers, 148 Col. 212, 365 P.2d 544 (1961)
(statement of declarant admitted to prove his mental state, not to prove
that it was true); Gass v. Garducci, 37 Ill. App. 2d 181, 185 N.E.2d 285(1962) (previous statement of defendant concerning the likelihood that a car
door might open, introduced not to prove that fact, but to establish
defendant's knowledge of it).
7 Similarly, if in an action for fraud, the plaintiff offers as evidence
statements of the defendant that a valueless object was worth hundreds of
dollars, such evidence would not be submitted to prove the truth of the
matters asserted therein, and would therefore be admissible. See 6 J.
WIGMORE, EVmENCE § 1766 (3rd ed. 1940) for a discussion, and further
examples, of when the hearsay rule does not apply; see also E. McCoaisiCs,
EVIDENCE §228 (1954).
8 E. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 224 (1954):
'A person who relates a hearsay is not obliged to enter into any
particulars, to answer any questions, to solve any difficulties, to
reconcile any contradictions, to explain any obscurities, to remove
any ambiguities; he entrenches himself in the simple assertion that
he was told so, and leaves the burden entirely on his dead or absent
author.'
See also Rice v. Moudy, 217 Ark. 816, 233 S.W.2d 378, 380 n.3 (1950):
"Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends on the competency
and credibility of some person other than the zituess" (emphasis added);
Shinn v. Francis, 404 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Okla. 1965); Williams v. Morris,
200 Va. 413, 105 S.E.2d 829, 832 (1958); Cameron v. Boone, 62 Wash.
2d 420, 383 P.2d 277, 282 (1963).
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There will be situations where the particular time at which the
opportunity arises will determine the application of the hearsay
rule. For example, the prior statement of a witness, now in
court, under oath and subject to cross-examination, is objectionable
as hearsay even though none of the substantial hearsay risks
are involved and it is difficult to justify classifying his prior
statement as hearsay.
Although there are numerous dicta accepting . . . [the view] that
hearsay is that kind of evidence which does not derive its value
solely from the credit to be given to the witness himself, but rests
also, in part, on the veracity and competency of some other person,
the dictum rarely becomes decision. The courts declare the prior
statement [of the witness] to be hearsay because it was not . . .
subject to . . the test of cross-examination [when made]. 9
As a result, the presence of the witness in the courtroom
will not alone be sufficient to remove the hearsay objection in all
instances.10  The rule is that the statement, when made, must
be subject to cross-examination.
Despite the general rule, the previous statements of a witness
are not completely inadmissible as hearsay. An attorney may
introduce a previous statement of a witness which is inconsistent
with his present position for the purpose of impeaching the cred-
ibility of the witness.:"- However, such statements may not be
used as affirmative substantive evidence of the truth of the
matter asserted therein 1 2 unless: (a) the declarant-witness is
0 Morgan, supra note 3, at 192 (emphasis added). This is true only
when the witness is not a party to the action. When he is such a
party, his previous inconsistent statements may be introduced as affirmative
evidence against him.
1oThe position of the courts is that when a statement is offered as
evidence, the credit of the assertor becomes the basis of the inference,
and therefore the statement can be received only when made upon the
stand, subject to cross-examination-not when made extrajudicially. Petition
of Earle, 355 Mich. 596, 95 N.W.2d 833 (1959); Mash v. Pacific R.R.,
341 S.W.2d 822 (Mo. 1960).
"'United States v. Ploof, 311 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1963); Rogers v.
Saye, 106 Ga. App. 453, 127 S.E.2d 161 (1962); People v. Moses, 11 Ill.
2d 84, 142 N.E.2d 1 (1957).12 See, e.g., Green v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry., 337 F.2d 673 (6th Cir.
1964); In re Dalton's Estate, 346 Mich. 613, 78 N.W.2d 266 (1956);
People v. Freeman, 9 N.Y.2d 600, 176 N.E.2d 39, 217 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1961).
Some courts have indicated that the admission of evidence for impeachment
purposes is an exception to the hearsay rule. United States v. Ploof,
311 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1963); Foryan v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 27 Wisc.
2d 133, 133 N.W.2d 724 (1965). This is not accurate, in that the evidence,
having no substantive value, may not be used to prove the truth of the
matter asserted therein. Hearsay is involved only where there is such an
attempt to prove the truth of the matter asserted. See supra, notes 5-7,
and accompanying text.
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a party to the action,18 (b) the witness under cross-examination
admits the truth of the previous statement,14 or (c) the previous
statement comes within a recognized exception to the hearsay
rule.1 5 Therefore, if the only evidence of some essential fact
is in the inconsistent previous statement, and none of the above
mentioned exceptions have been met, the party's case must fail
since the evidence would have no substantive value, and there
would not be evidence sufficient-in-law for the jury to base a
verdict upon.1 6
Therefore, in spite of its underlying logic, the hearsay rule
is not an inflexible one and judges have continually developed
exceptions thereto.17  These exceptions have been allowed where
there is a necessity that the evidence be admitted and the circum-
stances are such that the safeguard of cross-examination may be
omitted without endangering the trustworthiness of the particular
testimony in question. s Of the numerous exceptions to the
hearsay rule,19 three are of particular importance for an under-
standing of the principal-surety rule which is applicable in a
situation where the principal seeks to introduce the statements of
the employee in order to recover from the surety. They are
declarations against interest, vicarious admissions, and res gestae.
It is submitted, and will be developed subsequently, that although
it is usually under the third exception that statements of a
principal are admitted against his surety, the justification and
theoretical basis for this admission of evidence derives from the
first two exceptions.
The first exception, declarations against interest, rests on
the premise that one would not make a statement against his
pecuniary or proprietary interest unless he believed that state-
I8Texter v. State, 170 Neb. 426, 102 N.W.2d 655 (1960); Stoelting
v. Hauck, 32 N.J. 87, 159 A.2d 385 (1960); Bizich v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 391 Pa. 640, 139 A.2d 663 (1958).
1
4 Schratt v. Fila, 371 Mich. 238, 123 N.W.2d 780 (1963); State v.Davis, 400 S.W.2d 141 (Mo. 1966); Jones v. Lenoir City Car Works,
216 Tenn. 351, 392 S.W.2d 671 (1965).
15For example, declarations against interest, vicarious admissions, and
res gestae, discussed infra.16 Globe Indem. Co. v. Richerson 315 F.2d 3 (5th Cir. 1963); Eisenberg
v. United States, 273 F.2d 127 (th Cir. 1959). This is of crucial sig-
nificance in an action to recover on a fidelity bond, wherein the only
evidence of the defalcation is the principal's admission of theft, made to
the employer, which the employee then denies at trial.
.7 See, e.g., G.M. McKelvey Co. v. General Cas. Co., 166 Ohio St. 401,
142 N.E.2d 854 (1954).
18 WIGmor, EvImFcE, supra note 7, at § 1421. See also Dallas County
v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961).
39The Uniform Rules Qf Evidence lists 31 exceptions. UNmrox
Rulms OF Evmaqcz, Rule 63.
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ment to be true.20  An unusual aspect of this exception is that
in certain jurisdictions, a statement against one's penal interest
is not sufficient to come within the exception's purview.2" In
addition to the requirement that the declaration be against one's
interest, it is almost universally required that the declarant be
unavailable for testimony.22
Vicarious admissions are also considered by the courts as an
exception to the hearsay rule, although some commentators have
classified them as outside the scope of that rule.23  The theory
behind vicarious admissions is that if there is sufficient privity be-
tween two parties, A and B, the admissions of A can be imputed
to B. Inasmuch as the law then considers B to be making the
admission, he cannot object that he did not have the opportunity
to cross-examine himself.24  Thus, the vicarious admissions excep-
tion is based substantially on principles of agency. For example,
in order for the admission of an employee to be imputed to his
employer, there are two basic requisites: (a) an agency must
exist by which the agent is authorized to act and speak in the
principal's interest,25 and (b) the statement must be contemporane-
ous, or nearly so, with the fulfillment of the particular duties of the
20See, e.g., Wirthlin v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 56 F2d 137 (10th Cir.
1932); Kittredge v. Grannis, 244 N.Y. 168, 155 N.E. 88 (1926).21 See, e.g., McGraw v. Horn, 134 Ind. App. 645, 183 N.E.2d 206
(1962).22Levy v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 31 Ill. App. 2d 157, 175 N.E.2d
607 (1961); Forrest County Cooperative Assoc. v. McCaffrey, 253 Miss.
486, 176 So. 2d 287 (1965); Brown v. Warner, 78 S.D. 647, 107 N.W2d 1(1961). The courts have been specific in defining unavailability in a
number of cases. See, e.g., Frazure v. Fitzpatrick, 21 Cal. 2d 851, 136
P.2d 566 (1943) (death); G.M. McKelvey Co. v. General Cas. Co.,
166 Ohio St. 401, 142 N.E.21 845 (1954) (insanity and sickness);
Johnson v. Sleizer, 268 Minn. 421, 129 N.W.2d 761 (1964) (absence fromjurisdiction) ; Alexander Grant's Sons v. Phoenix Assur. Co., 25 App.
Div. 2d 93, 267 N.Y.S.2d 220 (4th Dep't 1966) (refusal to testify based
on privilege against self-incrimination). But see People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal.
2d 868, 389 P.2d 377, 63 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1964).
232 C. C[ASBERLAYNE, EvmgNcE §1292 (1911): "The competency
of an admission is not so much an exception to the rule excluding hearsay
as based upon a quasi-estoppel which controls the right of a party to
disclaim responsibility for any of his statements." See also 2 E. MORGAN,
BASIC PRoBLEms OF EvmExcE 266 (1961).2 4 MORGAIT, supra note 23, at 266, 272.
25 Cromling v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie RL., 327 F.2d 142 (3rd Cir.
1963); Pannell v. Fauber, 201 Va. 380, 111 S.E.2d 445 (1959). It must
be borne in mind that an authority to act does not necessarily imply an
authority to speak. Dillon v. Wallace, 148 Cal. App. 2d 447, 306 P.2d 1044(1957); 2 C. CHAMBERLAYNE, EvmaxcE § 1341 (1911); Morgan, Rationale
of Vicarious Admissions, 42 HAv. L. REv. 461, 464 (1929). Illustrative
is the situation in which a negligent chauffeur makes a statement admitting
his fault, and the injured party seeks to introduce this statement against
the employer. Id.
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agency.26  Although the agency may still exist, present narration
of past events by the agent is inadmissible.2 7
The distinctions between a declaration and an admission are
threefold:
(1) admissions must be made by a party or one in privity with a
party, whereas declarations may be made by disinterested third persons;
(2) admissions are acceptable in evidence as inconsistent with the
party's present position, whereas declarations are acceptable as con-
trary to the declarant's interest when inade; (3) admissions function
as waivers of proof, whereas declarations are admitted as proof of
the facts stated .
2
The third distinction is of particular importance. If the agent's
statement qualifies only as a declaration against interest, it then
constitutes only some proof of the principal's liability. If the state-
ment qualifies as a vicarious admission, then it is treated as a per-
sonal admission by the principal, further proof thereby being un-
necessary.
Res gestae as a term has come under great criticism because of
its lack of precision and the poverty of thought it conveys . 2  The
term means literally things done, or that which has been done, a
translation which is of little help in defining its true nature. Under
this term, two separate exceptions have developed, having separate
theoretical bases and justifications.
The first branch of res gestae is the verbal act concept. As
has been stated, a witness may testify to the acts of another and
2 8Patterson v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 238 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1956);
Roush v. Alkire Truck Lines, 299 S.W2d 518 (Mo. 1957). New York
originally required that the agent's statements be strictly contemporaneous
with the act in question in order to bind the principal. Schner v.
Simpson, 286 App. Div. 716, 146 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1st Dep't 1955). There
are indications though, that such is not the requirement today. Bransfield
v. Grand Union Co., 17 N.Y.2d 474, 214 N.E.2d 981, 266 N.Y.S.2d 981
(1965) (mem.).27 In general, under agency law, the agent is not authorized post factum
to discuss his principal's conduct, affairs, rights or liabilities. It is
only while the business is carried on that the agent may affect the
principal by his statemfents. C. CHAmBrLAYN., HAxNaoox oN THF
LAW oF EvmEccE §542 (1919).28 Note, Declarations Against Interest: A Critical Review Of The
Unavailability Requirement-Alexander Grant's Sons v. Phoenix Assurance
Co., 52 CoRNFL L.Q. 301, 311 (1967).
29For example, see United States v. Matot, 146 F.2d 197, 198 (2d
Cir. 1944), where Circuit judge Learned Hand observed: ". . . as for
'res gestae' . . . if it means anything but an unwillingness to think at all,
what it covers cannot be put in less intelligible terms," and 6 J. WIGMORE,
EvmNcE § 1745 (3d ed. 1940) where the author notes that there has
been such a confounding of ideas, and such a profuse and indiscriminate
use of the shibboleth 'res gestae; that it is difficult to disentangle the real
basis of principle involved."
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his testimony is admissible. The hearsay objection usually arises
when the other's statements are introduced by the witness. How-
ever, a statement may be the "act" at issue, such as an acceptance
of an offer, or it may be so intertwined with an act so as to be
considered part of it. In such a situation, the statement, being a
part of the act, illustrating its character, may be testified to by the
witness.30 As with vicarious admissions, a theory has been ad-
vanced that this situation is not within the scope of the hearsay
rule, rather than an exception to it.31
The second branch of res gestae is termed "spontaneous declara-
tions." The rationale of this exception is that under the stress of
circumstances, such as an accident, the reflective faculties are stilled,
and the true perceptions of the declarant are revealed.32  Essential
to this exception are its operative element-spontaneity and its evi-
dentiary element-substantial contemporaneity.33  While a greater
time period between the event and the statement affords a greater
opportunity to fabricate-and vice versa-the mere fact that the
statement did not coincide exactly in time and place with the event
does not control. The pertinent point is rather whether there was
sufficient time to allow an opportunity for reflection and invention.8 4
Originally, the courts applied the verbal act branch of res
gestae to the principal-surety situation. Thus, an admission of theft
by the principal (employee), in order to be admissible against the
surety, had to be contemporaneous with the theft, so as to be
considered part of the act.35 However, the majority of jurisdictions
gradually redefined res gestae to make it synonymous with the
period of employment and the rule emerged that the statement
made by the principal, while still employed is admissible against
3oSee 2 E. MoRGAN, BAsIC PROBLEMS OF EvmnicE 328 (1961).
316 J. WiGMoRE, EvmE~cE § 1766, et seq. (3d ed. 1940).
32 Id. at § 1747:
Since this utterance is made under the immediate and uncontrolled
dominion of the senses, and during the brief period when consider-
ations of self-interest could not have been brought fully to bear
by reasoned reflection, the utterance may be taken as particularly
trustworthy . . . and thus as expressing the real tenor of the
speaker's belief as to the facts just observed by him; and may
therefore be received as testimony to those facts.33 See United States v. Mountain State Fabricating Co., 282 F.2d 263
(4th Cir. 1960); Rockford Clutch Div., Borgwarner Corp. v. Industrial
Comm., 37 Ill. 2d 62, 224 N.E.2d 830 (1967); Clinton G. Caudwell, Inc.
v. Patterson, 133 Ind. App. 138, 177 N.E.2d 490 (1961).34 See Ellis v. Southern Ry., 96 Ga. App. 687, 101 S.E.2d 230 (1957);
Perkins v. Chicago Transit Auth., 60 Ill. App. 2d 431, 203 N.E.2d 867
(1965); Roland v. Beckham, 408 S.W.2d 628 (Ky. 1966).
35 Stetson v. City Bank of New Orleans, 2 Ohio St 167 (1853). See
olso notes 39-45, infra,
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the surety as part of the res gestae.36 Conversely, a statement
made after the termination of employment is inadmissible.
The basis of the principal-surety rule has also been characterized
in terms of vicarious admissions and agency. The employee is
considered an agent of the surety, in that the surety may be held
to authorize the employee to account for the monies entrusted to
him, which he does when he admits the theft." Despite some
criticism, 38 this is nevertheless a far more rational explanation of
the principal-surety rule than res gestae-particularly since the
termination of employment terminates the extent of admissibility.
The first major New York case on the topic of fidelity bonds
was Hatch v. Elkins.3 9 There the surety had bound himself to
indemnify the plaintiffs for all losses they might sustain by acting
as the principal's brokers in the sale of stocks. Certain letters by
the principal acknowledging the amount of the debt were admitted
into evidence and the issue was the amount of the debt outstanding
and the admissibility of these letters to establish said amount. The
Court of Appeals observed:
The declarations of the principal made during the transaction of the
business for which the surety is bound, so as to become part of the
res gestae are competent evidence against the surety; but his declar-
ations subsequently made are not competent. . . . '[T]he surety is
considered bound only for the actual conduct of the party, and not
for whatever he might say he had done, and therefore is entitled
to proof of his conduct by original evidence when it can be had,
excluding all declarations of the principal made subsequent to the
act to which they relate.. .' 4
386 Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Krone, 177 Ark. 953, 9 S.W.2d 33 (1928);
Piggly Wiggly Ynma Co. v. New York Indem. Co., 116 Cal. App. 541,
3 P.2d 15 (1931); Alexander Grant's Sons v. Phoenix Assur. Co., 25
App. Div. 2d 93, 267 N.Y.S.2d 220 (4th Dep't 1966); Dietrich v. Dr. Koch
Vegetable Tea Co., 56 Okla. 636, 156 P. 188 (1916).
372 E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EviDNcE 277 (1961):
Where, as in a fidelity contract, the surety obligates himself to be
responsible for the performance of the principal's duty of reporting
accurately and honestly to the assured details of the performance of
duty, it requires no strained construction to hold that the principal's
acknowledgment of receipt of funds or property and confession of his
tortious or criminal disposition of them made in the course of duty to
the assured is a statement authorized by the surety and should be
treated as if made by him. The decisions generally admit evidence of
such statements when made to the assured, some treating them as
admissions and others concealing the reasons in terms of res gestae.
Id.
88See Note, Declarations Against Interest: A Critical Review Of The
Unavailability Requirement, 52 Coimumr L. REV. 301, 312 (1967), for a crit-
icism of the theory.




Since the statements of the principal were made, not when he was
engaged in any transaction as to buying or selling stock, but after
all the transactions were closed, they were not part of the res gestae
and were therefore inadmissible. This case placed New York in
the minority position since it implemented the verbal act theory
and required the statements to be contemporaneous with the act in
order to be res gestae.
Subsequent New York cases reiterated the verbal act theory.
For example, in Wieder v. Union Surety and Guaranty Company,41
the employer sought to establish the liability of the defendant by
testifying about a conversation with the employee, after the em-
bezzlement had occurred, wherein the employee allegedly admitted
the crime. The court would not allow the admission of this evi-
dence for such purposes observing that: "[T]he rule seems to be
well settled that a party holding an indemnity cannot prove the
loss sustained by him . . . by the mere admissions or statements
of the principal," since the statements were not in any sense a part
of the res gestae of the transactions out of which the alleged em-
bezzlement arose.42
A further illustration of the application of the verbal act theory
is Marcus v. Fidelity and Deposit Company.4 3 There the appellate
division refused to allow the plaintiff to introduce as part of the
res gestae certain incriminating statements of the principal, who
had died before trial. The court noted that the defendant could
not be bound by the principal's admissions after the event since
they were neither contemporaneous with the event nor so connected
with it as to be considered part of the transaction."4 Thus, the
verbal act theory continued to dominate New York's law of evi-
dence until very recent years.45
New York law made a profound change in direction in Alex-
ander Grant's Sons v. Phoenix Assurance Company of New York.46
There the defalcating employees gave inculpatory statements to a
detective and made statements in their own handwriting admitting
misappropriations while still employed by the insured. The appel-
late division allowed the admission of the statements as part of the
res gestae, even though they were not contemporaneous with the
act. The court distinguished Hatch by pointing out that the earlier
case dealt with securities transactions, and should not be precedent
in determining res gestae in an employment situation, thereby re-
pudiating the verbal act doctrine and its requirement of contem-
4142 Misc. 499, 86 N.Y.S. 105 (App. Term 1904).
42 1d. at 500, 86 N.Y.S. at 105-06.
-13164 App. Div. 859, 149 N.Y.S. 1020 (1st Dep't 1914).
14 Id. at 861, 149 N.Y.S. at 1021.
4See, e.g., John T. Stanley v. National Surety Corp., 179 Misc. 493,
39 N.Y.S.2d 509 (Sup. Ct 1943).
4625 App. Div, 24 93, 267 N.Y.S.24 220 (4th Dep't 1966).
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poraneity. 47 In addition, the case demonstrated that refusal to
testify based upon the privilege against self-incrimination is suffi-
cient unavailability for declaration against interest purposes. While
the status of the law in New York was still doubtful since the
great bulk of precedent supported the verbal act theory, this case
provided a potential means of transition for bringing New York
into the majority position.
Victor Letendre, the plaintiff in the instant case,4 was the
owner of a New York gas station. Upon going to Florida, he
secured a fidelity bond from the defendant on James Tremblay,
the principal, whom he had left in charge of the station. Upon his
return, he discovered an inconsistency in the records of the station,
and promptly notified defendant's claim agent, who handled the
investigation. On June 12th and 17th, 1963, at the agent's office,
Tremblay denied any theft of the monies involved. On July 9th,
at the claim agent's office, Tremblay-warned that anything he said
might be held against him-admitted a defalcation of at least $5000.
On July 18th, upon advice of his lawyer, the plaintiff dismissed
Tremblay, whose wages were being credited to the shortages. Sub-
sequently, Tremblay retracted all his previous statements, admitting
only a defalcation of $400. He explained his July 9th statement as
a product of a guilty mind since his employer had suffered a loss
due to his poor management. At the trial Tremblay denied any
defalcations.
In order to prove his case, plaintiff sought to introduce as his
principal substantive evidence Tremblay's previous incriminatory
statements. Defendant made timely and proper objection to the
admission of the evidence for this purpose, arguing on the basis of
Hatch that they were extrajudicial statements made after the acts
to which they related. The supreme court and the appellate division
allowed the evidence and plaintiff recovered the full amount of the
bond. The Court of Appeals agreed with the conclusion of the
appellate division, allowing the evidence, but disagreed with the
latter court's distinction of Hatch, thereby overruling it. It also
concurred with the lower courts' conclusion that the admissibility
of incriminatory statements should not be dependent upon res gestae
or the continuation of the employment relationship. The Court
announced the test to be that "[i)n an action by an employer to
recover on a fidelity bond, an extrajudicial declaration made by his
employee should be admissible as affirmative evidence against the
surety, where the declaration is in writing and the declarant is
available for purposes of cross-examination." 49
47 Id. at 97, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 224.48 Letendre v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 21 N.Y.2d 518, 236 N.F_.2d
467, 289 N.Y.S.2d 183 (1968).
49 Id. at 522, 236 N.E.2d at 469, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 187.
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While the original policy reason behind the Hatch rule was to
prevent collusion between the employer and employee, the Court
found this no longer relevant. First, it was highly unlikely that an
employee would admit to a crime in order to accommodate his em-
ployer. Indeed, there was a greater danger of collusion in an auto
accident, yet the legislature had not felt it necessary to enact a guest
statute. The facts of the case, in the majority's view, illustrated
the injustice of the rule, i.e., it would exclude essential evidence
since plaintiff had turned over complete charge of the investigation
to the defendant who had obtained the statements from Tremblay.
The Court reasoned that ". . . Tremblay's statements were hear-
say. Nevertheless, none of the classic dangers, which justify the
hearsay rule, are present in this case." 50 In particular, the Court
weighed heavily the factor that the defendant was present in court,
subject to oath and the safeguard of cross-examination and that
the jury had ample opportunity to assess his credibility. The
Court therefore found that ". . . a departure from the general rule
excluding hearsay evidence is proper here." "' The majority also
noted that the exception which it created had greater justification
than declarations against interest, in which there is no opportunity
to cross-examine because of the unavailability requirement. Thus
the Court in effect left intact the declaration against interest ex-
ception, circumventing it in reaching its own conclusion.
Judge Breitel, dissenting, first discussed whether a proper
objection to the evidence was made and whether the objection was
preserved, affirmatively, resolving both issues. The dissent then
approved the Hatch rule, not only because of its durable quality,
but also because, in its opinion, it fitted neatly into the general
rules of evidence excluding hearsay. The dissent approved Wig-
more's position when it stated that the "so-called res gestae
exception is not a true exception but relates to the verbal acts of
the faithless employee at the very time that he is conducting his
employer's business." 52 Thus, the dissent not only disapproved
the instant case, but also the Alexander Grant's case, because "inso-
far as it introduces the factor of the employee's continued employ-
ment, [it] rests on doubtful logic and an even more doubtful
pragmatic basis."53 In cases dealing with admissions and agency,
the status of employment by itself is not the determining factor,
since, from a practical point of view, the continuing employment
relationship enhances the risk of collusion.
To the dissent, the facts of the case, rather than supporting
the majority's conclusion, exemplified the increased risk of collusion.
5o Id. at 524, 236 N.E.2d at 470, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 188.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 529, 236 N.E.2d at 473, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 193.
s 3d.
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The plaintiff had admitted that, but failed to explain why, there
were certain disbursements which were not recorded in the station's
records. In addition, the plaintiff's continuation of Tremblay's
employment raised the question of the plaintiff's credibility. In
concluding, the dissent noted that, in any event, since the Court
had expounded a new rule of evidence, the defendant should have
been granted a new trial, since he had relied on rules of evidence
now declared by the Court to be erroneous.
The significant element of the Court's reasoning, was the reali-
zation that the presence of the declarant as a witness is an important
factor to be considered in determining admissibility. Inasmuch as
the trier does not have to look to any person other than the witness
for the statement's veracity, theoretically the hearsay rule should
have no application. Unfortunately, the courts do treat such state-
ments as hearsay, but this case presents a hopeful sign of change.
The Court gave at least tacit approval to the exception proposed
by the Uniform Rules of Evidence that all previous statements of a
declarant present for cross-examination- be admissible. 4
Perhaps the better approach would have been a re-examination
of the existing exceptions, especially the unavailability requirement
of declarations against interest.-5 The Court created a new excep-
tion for fidelity bond cases, yet in justifying its course of action,
much of its reasoning was simply a reiteration of the probative
values which support declarations against interest. Excepting the
requirement of unavailability, the admission of theft by an employee
would seem to fall squarely within the declaration against interest
exception. The probative values of truthworthiness which support
the declaration against the interest exception are sufficient to sup-
port the exception-namely an individual would not normally admit
to a theft or other crime unless it were true. The unavailability re-
quirement, a result of the necessity principle, adds nothing to the
trustworthiness of a statement-rather it reduces the probability of
such by precluding an opportunity to cross-examine. Therefore,
it seems that the most rational approach would be to abandon the
unavailability requirement-at least in the situation where the de-
falcations are admitted-and to make the two exceptions synonymous,
especially where the statements made are contrary to one's penal
interest. Such an approach would help to work the hearsay excep-
tions into a more orderly body of law.
The Court, obviously displeased with the state of hearsay law,
unfortunately was overly cautious in revising it. While the intro-
duction of such evidence might be more necessary in fidelity bond
cases than in others, it is unwise to revise the law by creating
5 4 UNrFoRm RuLms oF EVmENCE, Rule 63 (1).
55See Note, supra note 38. The Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule
63(10), also advocates the abolition of this requirement.
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special rules of evidence for different causes of action. Had the
Court abolished the unavailability requirement, then the pre-
cedential effect of this case would not have been limited to
fidelity bond cases. There is no reason, for example, why the
statements of a former officer of a corporation, who is present for
cross-examination, which statements admit liability for an act done
while in the capacity of an officer, should be excluded as affirma-
tive evidence against the corporation. Similar reasoning would
apply to the statements of a former agent, employee, partner, or
former joint owner of property, which were made in the course of
the relationship. The Court of Appeals, rather than clarifying the
clouded state of the law of hearsay, merely added to the confusion
created by centuries of judicial evasiveness in establishing "rules"
of evidence.
LABOR LAW - UNION COERCION OF GENERAL CONTRACTOR
CAUSING HIM TO DISCRIMINATE AGAINST SUBCONTRACTOR EM-
PLOYEES HELD NOT TO BE AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE SINCE THE
EMPLOYEES WERE NOT HIS OWN. - A union local, whose members
were employed by a general contractor, picketed a construction site
and conducted a work stoppage to protest a subcontractor's use of
non-union labor, thereby forcing the general contractor to cancel its
contract with the subcontractor. The subcontractor filed an unfair
labor practice charge against the union alleging unlawful coercion of
the general contractor forcing him to discriminate against the sub-
contractor's employees. The National Labor Relations Board held
that no unfair labor practice was committed by the union because
the prohibition against the unlawful coercion of an employer which
forces him to discriminate against employees applies only where
the employees are those of the coerced employer. Local 447,
United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumb-
ing and Pipefitting Iwdustry (Malbaff), 172 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 5 CCH
LAB. L. REP. (1968-1 CCH NLRB Dec.) 22,652 (June 24, 1968).
The original National Labor Relations Act ' [hereinafter re-
ferred to as the NLRA], was passed for the express purpose of
eliminating the causes underlying labor disputes which obstructed
interstate commerce,2 but was generally thought to be too labor and
' The National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) of 1935 was amend-
ed by the Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) of 1947
and the Labor-Management Reporting & Disclosure Act (Landrum-Griffin
Act) of 1959 and is currently found in 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-66 (1964).
2 Myers, The Vational Labor Relations Act in Strike Situations,
18 B.U.L. REv. 282, 283-84 (1938).
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